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OPTIONAL SAFETY DEVICES: Delegating
Product Design Responsibility to the Market
James A. Henderson, Jr.* & Aaron D. Twerski
I. INTRODUCTION: THE DELEGATION ISSUE IN A NUTSHELL
Early in the development of a robust system of products liability law,
American courts delegated most of the responsibility for assuring the safety
of product designs to the market. Except for designs that failed to perform
their intended functions and thus could be said to be dangerously self-
defeating,' most courts rejected claims that products were legally defective
because they could have been designed more safely.2 As long as the relevant
risks were obvious or product sellers supplied adequate warnings of hidden
risks, product purchasers, not courts, determined how much design safety
was appropriate. The so-called "patent danger rule," a no-duty rule barring
design claims when risks of harm are obvious, ruled the roost.3 And then
came the products liability revolution. Spurred by the adoption of strict
liability under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,4 courts began
in the 1970s to question, and then to reject, the idea that adequately-
informed consumers always make sensible decisions regarding product
design safety.' Thus arrived a new era in American products liability in
which courts began independently to review the reasonableness of
*. James A. Henderson, Jr., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
**. Aaron D. Twerski, Irwin and Jill Cohen Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. For a discussion of the early case law responding to self-defeating designs, which the
author refers to as "inadvertent design errors," see James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Reviews of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
1531, 1550-52 (1973).
2. For a discussion of the early case law responding to what the author describes as
"manufacturers' conscious design choices," see Henderson, Jr., supra note 1, at 1552-53, 1565-
73. "In the great majority of [late 1960s, early 1970s] cases, courts have refused to allow juries
to pass independent judgment upon the adequacy of defendants' conscious design choices." Id.
at 1565.
3. See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
PROBLEMS AND PROCEss 183 (7th ed. 2011) ("Referred to as the 'patent danger rule,' this
single-factor barrier to [design-based] liability reigned in many jurisdictions.").
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
5. For an early recognition that courts were beginning to review the reasonableness of
product designs and that commentators were predicting expansion of what they saw as the
beginnings of a trend, see Henderson, Jr., supra note 1, at 1552 n.92 and text accompanying.
For an assessment of more recent trends, see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 867, 905-919 (1998).
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manufacturers' product design choices, thereby second-guessing decisions
reached in the market. In fairly short order courts abolished the patent
danger rule' and opened their doors to a broad range of fault-based design
defect claims.
The changes over the past four decades have been dramatic, so much so
that one might be tempted to conclude that purchasers' decisions regarding
product design safety are no longer of serious moment. Three important
exceptions render such an assessment unwarranted. First, courts continue
steadfastly to refuse to review the reasonableness of market decisions
regarding the generic, unavoidable risks of broad product categories such as
motor vehicles, productive machinery, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco
products.! Particular designs within these categories are deemed defective
when they could have been made marginally safer at acceptable cost. But
courts will not review market choices regarding the reasonableness of the
broad product categories themselves.' Second, even when courts second-
guess market decisions regarding the design safety of particular products
within the broader categories, an important factor in these judicial
assessments is the social value of maintaining a reasonable range of
consumer choice.' 0
The third significant exception to the general pattern of courts overriding
markets by engaging in broad product design review-a controversial
subject upon which this article focuses-concerns optional safety devices
with respect to which purchasers, not courts, often make the controlling
decisions." Optional safety devices are ubiquitous in the sale of both
consumer goods and industrial machinery. All sorts of products are
routinely marketed with a wide range of optional devices and features,
many of which have significant safety implications. Courts in recent years
have struggled with the question of when to include a given safety device as
part of the court-imposed responsibilities of commercial product sellers and
6. See James A. Henderson, Jr., The Demise of the Patent Danger Rule, 3 CORP. L. REV.
78 (1980). See generally HENDERSON, JR. & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 184.
7. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263
(1991); Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr. Manufacturers' Liability for Defective
Product Designs: The Triumph ofRisk- Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 1061 (2009).
8. See generally HENDERSON, JR. & TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 247.
9. See generally Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of
Liability Without Defect, supra note 7.
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998).
11. See generally Richard C. Ausness, Risky Business: Liability of Product Sellers Who
Offer Safety Devices as Optional Equipment, 39 HOFSTRA L. REv. 807 (2011); James A.
Henderson, Jr., The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort: Promoting Private Solutions to Risk-
Management Problems, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 221 (2013).
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when to delegate responsibility to private decision-makers in the
marketplace. Delegation occurs when sellers offer arguably cost-effective
safety devices as options and courts subsequently refuse to hold product
sellers liable for failing to include such safety devices as standard
equipment.
Deciding when to mandate that safety features be included in product
designs and when to allow purchasers to make those decisions requires
courts to pit the paternalistic tilt of modem American products liability
law-that government knows best-against the strong desire of product
users and consumers to tailor products to their own personal needs and
preferences. This clash of perspectives is especially problematic when a
purchaser's decision to omit a given safety feature puts third parties at risk
of harm. For example, an employer's decision not to incorporate a safety
device into a piece of industrial equipment may benefit the employer and its
customers by increasing productivity, and thus may benefit employees
generally by justifying higher wages. But omitting the safety feature may
have disastrous consequences for individual employees who suffer harm
while working with such marginally more dangerous equipment. Given
these considerations, judicial mandates requiring inclusion of safety features
under such circumstances are understandable.
Regardless of how one answers the question of when delegation of
responsibility for product design safety is appropriate, the applicable legal
rule must afford the commercial product seller a measure of predictability
of outcome. In the current American products liability system, a plaintiff
attacks a product design by proving that the manufacturer could have
adopted a reasonable alternative design ("RAD") that would have prevented
the plaintiffs injury.12 By offering a safety device as an option, a
commercial seller runs the risk of providing a built-in RAD with which a
victim, subsequently injured by the omission of the device, may condemn
the seller's design as legally defective." Absent some measure of assurance
flowing from a no-duty rule on which sellers who offer optional safety
features may reasonably rely, sellers may tend to refuse to make such offers,
in which case the social benefits of delegating safety decisions to the parties
are lost.14
12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
13. By offering the option, the seller, in the absence of a no-duty rule, may be deemed to
have admitted that the safety device should have been included to begin with. A similar risk
arises whenever product sellers improve their designs to make them safer. See HENDERSON, JR.
& TWERSKI, supra note 3, at 220-24.
14. The benefits may be gauged from either of the two normative perspectives suggested
in subsection II.A., infra. Thus, if product purchasers are in a better position than are courts to
make the relevant choices, delegating responsibility to the market will increase allocative
45:1399] 1401
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This Essay offers and defends such a no-duty rule. Rather than be
satisfied with vague references to an appropriate solution, the analysis is
specific in its recommendations. Thus, as former co-Reporters for the
Products Liability Restatement, 5 the authors offer a black-letter rule,
together with comments, for the reader's consideration. The proposal does
not carry the imprimatur of the American Law Institute. Rather, it
represents the authors' views on how to structure a no-duty rule that reflects
the case law and balances the competing social interests. Part II provides an
appropriate theoretical framework, including normative perspectives,
process considerations, and illustrative factual paradigms. Part III then
examines the case law addressing the issues surrounding optional safety
devices, demonstrating how the decisions are largely consistent with the
theoretical analysis in Part II. And Part IV offers a specific proposal in
traditional Restatement format.
II. AN APPROPRIATE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: NORMS,
PROCESSES, PARADIGMS
A. Normative Perspectives: When Is Delegation Justified?
This is not the place to determine, once and for all, the normative
objectives of products liability law, or tort law more generally. Most of
what follows reflects an instrumental perspective: How should courts
approach the question of delegating design responsibility to product
purchasers so as to enhance allocative efficiency? One could replace the last
part of this question with "so as to promote consumer sovereignty?" without
diminishing the usefulness of the analysis. Even if, on the final day of
reckoning, the noninstrumental perspective of enhancing consumer
sovereignty-the right of individuals to participate meaningfully in defining
their own personhood-trumps the achievement of collective welfare,16 an
instrumental approach based on assessments of who will likely make better
efficiency. And assuming consumer-purchasers can be expected to make informed, rational
choices, delegation will enhance consumer sovereignty.
15. The authors served from 1992-1998, from the outset through completion of the
project. The American Law Institute named them R. Ammi Cutter Distinguished Reporters in
1997.
16. The test would be whether, whenever the enhancement of consumer sovereignty
demanded a ruling or an outcome that decreased allocative efficiency, courts would be bound to
enhance sovereignty. The two objectives might (and almost certainly would) support the same
outcomes in most instances. But whenever push came to shove, consumer sovereignty would
prevail.
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choices is useful. Even if the enhancement of individual personhood is the
ultimate objective, courts must be concerned with adopting the most
effective means of achieving that objective."
Viewed instrumentally, the important question presented in connection
with optional safety devices is whether and under what circumstances
product sellers may reasonably expect purchasers to make reasonable
decisions regarding whether or not to include such devices in product
designs. If purchasers cannot be expected to make sensible choices, courts
should not encourage sellers to give them opportunities to choose. Two
conditions necessary for product purchasers to make good choices regarding
optional safety devices have traditionally been articulated by courts and
commentators seeking to identify which classes of actors are efficient cost
minimizers." First, to be a competent risk manager an actor must have
access to accurate information regarding the relevant risks and risk-
minimizing strategies.19 And second, the actor must have the capacity to act
effectively based on the relevant information.2 0
Regarding product purchasers, the first of the foregoing characteristics-
access to risk information-is largely a function of the purchaser's previous
experience and expertise. The product seller owes a duty to warn and
instruct purchasers regarding nonobvious risks and risk-avoidance
measures.2 But to be able to exercise design safety options competently, the
purchaser must contribute a measure of product-related expertise. Children
and inexperienced, unsophisticated lay persons occupy one end of the
spectrum of relative knowledgeability, and professional experts occupy the
other. The second above-identified characteristic of an effective risk
manager-the capacity to act reasonably and effectively-is itself
comprised of two components: first, the actor must possess the cognitive
17. Another way of saying it is that, in the overwhelming majority of instances, increasing
allocative efficiency will serve to enhance consumer sovereignty. See generally Ernest J.
Weinrib, Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 50 UCLA L. REv. 621, 629-30 (2002) (noting that
the instrumental goal of deterring wrongful conduct is compatible with a noninstrumental goal
such as corrective justice as long as the two are conceptually sequenced so that the former gives
way to the latter when they come into conflict).
18. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 135 (1977); Ausness, supra note 11, at 818 n.79.
19. From an efficiency perspective the goal is to minimize the sum of accident costs and
avoidance costs. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 18, at 28. Thus, to be an efficient risk
minimizer, an actor must have good information regarding both variables.
20. Id. To act effectively, the actor must have the cognitive capacity to devise a sensible
plan of action and the practical means to implement such a plan.
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998). The authors
describe the shortcomings of the failure-to-warn doctrine in James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron
D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 292-311 (1990).
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capacity to work out a sensible plan of action based on available
information; and second, the actor must have access to the practical means
to implement the plan, once arrived at.22 Cognitive capacity, the first of
these components, is of primary importance here. More specifically, the
focus in connection with optional safety devices is on cognitive biases and
faulty heuristics that may cause some purchasers-e.g., unsophisticated
consumer-purchasers-to respond inappropriately to the question of
whether or not safety devices are called for. Chief among the cognitive
biases that are apt to lead to inappropriate responses are ones that cause
decision makers, especially unsophisticated, nonexpert decision-makers, to
overestimate their own intelligence, skill, and capacity as risk managers-
variations on what has been termed the "self-serving bias."2 3 In the present
context of optional safety devices, such a cognitive bias is likely to cause
purchasers who in actual fact require the protection provided by safety
devices to conclude, in error, that they do not.2 4
Faulty heuristics, or mental shortcuts, produce a similar negative effect
on judgment. 25 Thus, if a nonexpert purchaser erroneously believes that he
is a competent risk manager simply because he never uses a dangerous
product while intoxicated, he may refuse an optional safety device when,
for reasons having nothing to do with his not imbibing alcohol, he very
much needs the protection that the device affords.2 6 In similar fashion to the
self-serving bias, this faulty heuristic-that sobriety is the only variable
affecting risk-management skills-tends to prevent the purchaser from
reaching rational decisions even when possessed of accurate information
concerning the relevant external facts. Thus, in connection with dangerous
biases and faulty heuristics, while the purchaser may have access to good
information, he lacks the cognitive capacity to react sensibly to that
information. It should be observed that the single concept of "expertise"
embraces both access to good information and absence of cognitive
impediments. Thus, someone trained as an expert not only knows a great
deal about his field, but also has achieved a higher level of detachment from
the personal implications of his choices. In the analysis that follows, such
an actor is often referred as a "sophisticated" actor.
22. Cf supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
23. See generally Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 567 (2003). For a broader treatment of cognitive biases and faulty heuristics in
the context of optional safety devices, see Ausness, supra note 11, at 815-18.
24. See Ausness, supra note 11, at 816.
25. See Ausness, supra note 11, at 816-17.
26. See Farnsworth, supra note 23, at 569-70, 599.
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To these traditionally-recognized characteristics of knowledgeability and
cognitive capacity this analysis adds a third characteristic, as yet
unrecognized in the literature or judicial decisions, that must be satisfied for
a purchaser to reach reasonable, socially optimal decisions regarding
optional safety devices-adequate motivation to weigh the relevant social
costs and benefits without unduly favoring the purchaser's own selfish
interests. In this connection one may assume that the purchaser has access
to accurate information and is free of cognitive impediments that might
interfere with good judgment. The selfishness here referenced is rational;
indeed, for purposes of analysis, the purchaser may be presumed to
appreciate which choice regarding an optional safety device will increase
collective welfare. In contrast to the biases and faulty heuristics that lead
individual purchasers to make irrational choices that place the purchasers
themselves at unreasonable risks of harm, here the lack of motivation leads
even highly sophisticated, rational purchasers to make socially wasteful
choices that place third parties at excessive risk in order to reduce the
purchasers' own costs of investing in care.27
Lack of motivation to act reasonably has not been part of the traditional
formula for identifying efficient accident cost minimizers because the
analysis in that traditional context assumes that the actor identified as an
efficient minimizer will be held strictly liable in tort for the negative
consequences of his choices.2 8 By internalizing to the actor the costs of
accidents, the liability rule can assume that the actor engaged in cost-
minimization will behave in a socially responsible manner. By contrast, in
the context of optional safety devices, no threats of liability are aimed at the
product purchasers to whom safety options are given.29 Thus, before
condoning the delegation of responsibility to a particular class of
purchasers, a court must require some measure of assurance that the
presumably liability-free purchasers who exercise safety options are
motivated to make socially responsible decisions that adequately weigh
risks of harm to others. Paramount among the sources of such assurances is
the circumstance that the purchaser, himself, is among those at risk of
suffering harm from product use. Functionally, such exposure to risk of
harm provides the same sort of incentives, if not at the same levels of
27. This is one possible juncture where the individual sovereignty notion, which would see
to ignore third-party effects, would be at odds with the efficiency objective of collective
welfare, which would most certainly be concerned with third-party externalities.
28. See supra note 18.
29. Rather than threaten purchasers, the no-duty rule here under consideration eliminates
threats of sellers' liability, thereby encouraging sellers to offer options to which purchasers' self
interest will cause them to respond.
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intensity, as does presumed exposure to strict tort liability in the more
traditional context of searching for efficient accident cost minimizers." The
analysis in subsection C of this Part II addresses the question of how courts
should respond to the delegation issue when product purchasers-typically
commercial entities purchasing products for use by employees-are not
themselves at risk of harm.'
By way of a brief summary, to delegate responsibility to product
purchasers to decide whether to include optional safety devices in product
designs, courts aiming to enhance allocative efficiency must receive
assurances that those purchasers (1) have adequate access to good
information about the relevant risks and risk-avoidance measures, (2) are
cognitively capable of reaching rational conclusions regarding the choices
to make, and (3) are motivated to make reasonable choices that increase,
rather than diminish, collective welfare.
B. Process Perspectives: What Form ofLiability Rule Is Appropriate?
1. Why a Specifically-Defined No-Duty Rule, Based on Time-of-
Sale Circumstances, Is Required
If it is reasonable to assume that product purchasers naturally prefer
opportunities to tailor products to their own needs and preferences, they will
presumably take advantage of such opportunities when offered. Thus, what
is required is a liability rule that reasonably encourages commercial product
sellers to give purchasers opportunities to choose among a variety of
options, including optional safety devices. Three conditions primarily
relating to process rather than substance must be satisfied for such a liability
rule to achieve its objective. First, the liability rule must provide sellers with
a formal barrier-a safe harbor, if you will-against subsequent claims of
design defect based on the seller's failure to include the safety device as
standard equipment. Unless product sellers receive a fairly reliable
assurance in the form of a no-duty rule, they will tend not to offer safety
options even when it would be efficient to do so. Open-textured liability
rules calling for assessments of reasonableness under all the circumstances
may lead to judgments for defendants as a matter of law ("JMOLs") in a
30. The intensity of the incentive may be less because the purchaser may consider only the
value of the purchaser's own interests, whereas sellers held strictly liable will presumably
consider the value of all interests foreseeably placed at risk.
31. See infra pp. 12-16.
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scattering of instances, but courts are significantly more likely to enter
JMOLs when applying a no-duty rule.32
Second, the no-duty rule governing optional safety devices must be
based on circumstances as they appear to, or may be assumed by, a
reasonable seller at time of sale. To encourage product sellers to offer safety
devices as options, the liability rule cannot require them to wait to find out
whether the underlying realities--often not discernible by sellers at time of
sale-support a legal defense against design-based liability. In this respect,
the no-duty rule covering optional safety devices must function as does the
rule governing apparent consent; it must allow the actor-here the product
seller-to rely on reasonable appearances at the time action is taken.33 Thus,
rather than bar a seller's liability only when it is later revealed at trial that
the purchaser was capable of making sensible choices, the liability rule
must depend on reasonable appearances and expectations at time of sale.
And finally, for a no-duty rule to succeed in encouraging product sellers
to offer safety options, the rule must describe the factual circumstances
upon which the safe harbor is based with sufficient specificity to support
JMOLs in favor of defendant product sellers. For this to occur, the no-duty
rule must not rely exclusively on whether, based on appearances, a
reasonable seller would expect a particular purchaser to be knowledgeable,
capable, and motivated. Instead, the applicable standard must be bolstered
by presumptions, developed judicially over time, regarding which
specifically-defined classes of purchasers-e.g., unsophisticated consumers,
commercial risk managers, experienced experts-the seller may assume
possess which characteristics relevant to the court's decision regarding the
appropriateness of delegating responsibility to such purchasers. In this
respect, the courts will be required to identify specific subcategories of
purchasers in a manner similar to their development of subcategories of
dangerous activities to which common law strict liability applies.3 4
32. See generally JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 42-43 (8th ed.
2012). The best-known example of how centering a negligence analysis on the concept of duty
can affect the likelihood of a JNOV for defendant is Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1928).
33. The American origins of the apparent consent rule may be traced to O'Brien v. Cunard
S.S. Co., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891). Not only does allowing reliance on objective appearances
provide actors with assurances that they will not be "second-guessed" using hindsight, but it
reduces the complexity of the issues courts must decide. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr.,
The Constitutive Dimensions of Tort: Promoting Private Solutions to Risk-Management
Problems, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 221 (2013).
34. For a judicial plea that product category liability be handled in the same fashion see
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 463 A.2d 298, 310-15 (N.J. 1983) (Schreiber, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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2. Limits on the Risk-Management Capabilities of Courts
The focus thus far has been on the capabilities of product purchasers to
make sensible design choices. Bearing in mind that the alternative to
allowing purchasers to make the relevant design choices is for courts to
make the choices and impose them on the market, it is useful briefly to
consider limits on the judicial capacity to perform that design-review
function. The authors have explored this issue at length elsewhere.35 Suffice
it to say that the open-textured question of "How much product design
safety is enough?" presents courts with issues that are many-centered, or
polycentric;3 6 that polycentricity is a matter of degree and increases with
increases in the number and interconnectedness of the relevant variables;"
that highly polycentric problems require the exercise of discretion for their
solution and thus do not lend themselves to being solved by means of
adjudication;" and that polycentric problems do lend themselves to being
solved by individuals (e.g., product purchasers) who are free (as courts are
not) to exercise broad discretion in accepting or rejecting optional safety
devices." It follows that, in connection with deciding whether to recognize
a no-duty rule to encourage product sellers to offer optional safety devices,
courts should consider not only the capacities of purchasers but their own
institutional shortcomings as decision-makers.
C. Illustrative Factual Paradigms: How Courts Should Respond in
Actual Cases
What follow are sketches of how, in theory, courts should react to a
variety of factual paradigms, chosen to better explain the no-duty rule
advanced in this analysis. Part III, infra, discusses the relevant case law;
Part IV contains the proposed Restatement provision.
35. See, e.g., Henderson, Jr., supra note 1; James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Intuition and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88
GEO. L.J. 659 (2000); Henderson, Jr., supra note 33.
36. See Henderson, Jr., supra note 33, at 221.
37. Id.
3 8. Id.
39. Id.
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1. When Courts Should Not Delegate Safety Decisions to
Purchasers in the Market: The Default Position Favoring
Independent Judicial Design Review
Subject to exceptional circumstances described in subsection 2, below,
when product purchasers are unsophisticated consumers, courts should not
provide sellers with a safe harbor from liability when they offer cost-
effective safety devices on an optional basis. If the tort-plaintiff harmed by
the omission of a safety device can prove that the omitted device constitutes
a RAD, the commercial sellers should be held liable for defective design.
The characteristic that unsophisticated purchasers typically lack is not
motivation. One may assume that in most of these cases the products will be
consumer goods-e.g., motor vehicles and household products. Thus,
sellers can expect that a high percentage of consumer-purchasers (or their
loved ones) will use such products and thus be placed at risk of harm. Of
course, when third-party effects are likely to be the only negative effects
flowing from product use, lack of motivation on the part of purchasers helps
to justify the court's imposing RAD-based liability on the seller for giving
the purchaser the option of omitting the safety feature. But as long as the
individual purchaser or a loved one can be expected to be exposed to the
relevant risk of harm from product use, even if third parties are also at risk,
the purchaser may be assumed to possess adequate motivation to make a
sensible choice when given the opportunity.40
The characteristics that justify a judicial refusal to delegate important
safety decisions to unsophisticated consumer-purchasers, then, are the first
two identified earlier: As a general rule, that class of purchasers can be
expected to lack adequate information regarding the relevant risks and risk-
avoidance measures; and they can be expected to lack the cognitive capacity
to reach sensible conclusions regarding whether they (or their loved ones)
need the protection of optional safety devices. Quite simply, sellers of most
consumer products cannot reasonably expect their unsophisticated
purchasers to have access to the information necessary to make sensible
choices among safety options, nor can sellers reasonably expect such
purchasers to be sufficiently free from dangerous cognitive biases-"It
can't happen to me"-and faulty heuristics-"I'm sober, therefore I'm
careful"-to manage product-related risks adequately.
It should be borne in mind that this and subsequent discussions relate
only to classes of purchasers, not to idiosyncratic individuals within those
classes. As explained earlier, to provide product sellers with meaningful
40. When the purchaser or her loved ones are not the only ones at risk, the intensity (and
thus the adequacy) of the incentive may vary somewhat. Cf supra note 30.
45:1399] 1409
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safe harbors, sellers must be able to rely on reasonable expectations
regarding classes of purchasers without being exposed to subsequent
arguments that a particular purchaser/accident victim did not actually
conform to the characteristics of the relevant class.4 1 It must also be
remembered that this and subsequent discussions of different classes of
product purchasers assume that plausible claims could be made that, except
for the no-duty rule, the safety devices offered as options constitute RADs
that the defendant sellers should have included as standard equipment. If
such is not the case-if the design feature in question could not plausibly
serve as a RAD-then the product design is not defective quite apart from
the no-duty rule. However, the no-duty rule does increase the defendant's
chances of winning a JMOL.
By contrast to the noncommercial, unsophisticated purchasers,
sophisticated, presumably-expert purchasers can be expected not only to
have access to adequate information but also to be free of significant
cognitive impediments. Unlike consumer-purchasers, sophisticated
commercial purchasers, like successful poker players, have adequate
information and the steely-eyed, dispassionate mind-sets that are necessary
to make optimal decisions when the physical well-being--even the lives-
of putative victims are at stake. However, again in contrast to consumer-
purchasers, sophisticated commercial purchasers may be assumed to lack
adequate motivation to make socially responsible safety decisions. In the
great majority of instances, the individual risk-managers who act on behalf
of their commercial employers are not themselves (nor are their loved ones)
at risk of suffering harm from subsequent product use. Instead, almost
always the products are industrial machines and those in harm's way are
employees who operate the machines for the mutual benefit of themselves
and their employers. Moreover, the employers almost invariably enjoy,
under worker compensation statutes, immunities from tort liability to their
employees.42 Consequently, the injuries to employees that flow from their
employers' decisions to omit optional safety devices are classic examples of
the sorts of negative third-party effects that arise less often in their pure
forms in the context of noncommercial purchasers of consumer goods.4 3
It follows that courts should not as a general rule delegate to commercial
purchasers of industrial machinery responsibility for making product design
safety choices any more readily than they should delegate such
responsibility to noncommercial purchasers of consumer goods-but for
41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42. HENDERSON, JR., supra note 32, at 691.
43. Once again, purchasers of consumer goods typically use the products and thus are
motivated to take care. See supra notes 30, 40 and accompanying text.
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quite different reasons. Commercial purchasers can be expected to possess
both the information and the cognitive capacity to make reasonable choices,
but they may be expected to lack adequate motivation to do so. Conversely,
noncommercial consumer-purchasers may be expected to be adequately
motivated but to lack the necessary information and cognitive capacity. If
the story of optional safety devices were to end here, affirming the obvious
truth that sellers are liable for defective designs, it would be a story hardly
worth telling. What makes the story very much worth telling is contained in
the next subsection, which describes exceptional circumstances in which
instrumental considerations of promoting allocative efficiency-or
consumer sovereignty, if one prefers-very much support application of a
no-duty rule that gives product sellers a safe harbor from design-based
liability when they offer cost-effective safety devices as options rather than
including such devices as standard equipment.
2. When Courts Should Delegate Safety Decisions to Purchasers in
the Market: The No-Duty Rule in Action
The objective in the discussion that follows is to consider important
exceptions to the earlier-identified default position that courts should not
use a no-duty rule to encourage product sellers to delegate responsibility for
deciding whether or not to adopt optional safety devices. The first exception
involves delegations of responsibility for choosing among broad product
categories. Although product categories do not, strictly speaking, fit within
the narrower concept of safety devices, choices among such categories often
have important safety implications and thus warrant inclusion in this
analysis. Even if unsophisticated purchasers are presumably incapable of
choosing sensibly among optional safety devices that offer only marginal,
often obscure, differences in product safety-e.g., choosing between
ordinary automotive brakes and anti-lock brakes-those same purchasers
are presumably capable of choosing among broad product categories-e.g.,
choosing between subcompact and standard-size automobiles. Thus, given
that purchasers may choose rationally among different-size vehicles," when
a purchaser opts for a subcompact and later an injured tort plaintiff attacks
the subcompact's design because it lacks the crashworthiness of a full-size
vehicle, the court should invoke a no-duty rule-whether it be considered
44. In these contexts, speaking of optional "devices" is a bit awkward. Moreover, different
sellers may distribute the different design categories among which purchasers may choose. If
this awkwardness causes analytical confusion, it may be preferable to treat the no-duty rule
appropriate for broad product categories as conceptually distinct from the no-duty rule based on
optional safety devices. See infra Part IV, cmt. h.
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an "optional safety device" or a "no category liability" rule-and enter
JMOL for the defendant seller based on the proper delegation to the market
of responsibility for determining the vehicle's size.45 Once again, the
unsophisticated automobile purchaser presumably lacks the cognitive
acumen of a skillful poker player. But when it comes to choosing the size of
her vehicle based mainly on aggregative considerations such as initial
capital investment, operating costs, and aesthetics, her lack of information
and cognitive limitations relating to safety are less likely, compared with
trying to choose marginally what type of brakes to include, to cause her to
make an irrational choice.46 Indeed, when aesthetics dominate in making
such categorical choices, the consumer may meaningfully be treated as a
"sovereign" who presumptively knows best what pleases her.47
If to these considerations one adds the reality that courts are not
institutionally competent, in light of all the factors involved, to adjudicate
solutions to the polycentric problem of whether or not subcompact
automobiles are categorically defective, the response suggested by this
article's analysis is clear.48  Even if courts should not delegate to
unsophisticated purchasers the responsibility for making choices relating to
marginal, often obscure differences in product design safety, they should
most certainly delegate to those same purchasers, by means of a no-duty
rule, responsibility for choosing among broad categories of consumer
products.4 9
A second exception to the default position that product sellers should not
be encouraged to delegate responsibility for design safety to unsophisticated
purchasers arises in the unusual situation in which such purchasers may be
expected to be assisted in their decision making by highly expert advisers.
When product purchasers are commercial entities, one may expect this
condition to be satisfied routinely. But in the case of unsophisticated
consumer-purchasers when, because of special circumstances, sellers may
45. It will be observed that even if the tort plaintiff is not the purchaser, recovery should
be denied because the product is not defective, given delegation of responsibility to the
consenting purchaser. See generally Henderson, Jr., supra note 33 (Such a bar to recover is akin
to a consent-based defense, but it does not rest on the plaintiffs consent).
46. One could attempt to justify this distinction in terms of enhancing consumer
sovereignty, but with the constraint that the law should be concerned with her reaching
"sensible"-i.e. reasonable-decisions, it would seem that allocative efficiency is in the
normative driver's seat.
47. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Contract's Constitutive Core: Solving
Problems by Making Deals, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 104 nn.64-65 (2012).
48. See generally Henderson, Jr. & Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability
Frontier: The Rejection ofLiability Without Defect, supra note 7.
49. Whether or not to make this part of a no-duty rule based on optional safety devices,
rather than a separate rule, is a separate issue. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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expect such purchasers to be assisted by expert advisers, courts should
recognize the no-duty rule here being considered and refuse independently
to review the reasonableness of the purchaser's design safety choices.
A third exception to the general default position relating to
unsophisticated product purchasers becomes relevant when such purchasers
may be expected to possess expertise in connection with a relatively narrow
subset of product-related activity--e.g., amateur downhill ski racing. When
in that context a product seller offers choices among optional safety
devices-e.g., which type of bindings to install on which type of racing
skis-courts would be justified in applying a no-duty rule that bars the
seller's liability for failing to impose a particular safety device as standard
equipment. Of course, when adverse third-party effects are expected to be
significant in these circumstances, a court might properly refuse to
recognize such a rule for the reason that the purchaser lacks adequate
motivation; but that should occur only rarely."o The fourth and final
exception to the default rule denying delegation involves optional safety
devices that make it possible for risk averse purchasers to invest in care to
an extent above, rather than below, that required by consideration(s) of
collective welfare. These are circumstances in which product sellers should
be free to provide their abnormally risk-averse purchasers with
opportunities to reduce the relevant risks of harm to a greater extent than is
reasonable for normally risk-tolerant purchasers." In such circumstances the
seller should, in theory, not be liable because the design would not be
defective under a RAD approach.5 2 But a no-duty rule increases the
incidence of JMOLs and thus helps to encourage sellers to cater, by way of
optional safety devices, to their especially risk-averse clientele."
It remains to consider appropriate judicial responses when choices
among optional safety devices are made by sophisticated (almost always
commercial) product purchasers, typically in connection with industrial
machinery. It will be recalled from an earlier discussion that when attention
shifts to commercial purchasers, primary concerns over delegation shift
from the purchasers' informational, cognitive limitations to the likelihood
that commercial purchasers lack adequate motivation to weigh the interests
50. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 44.
51. Cf James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeff Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive
Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 213 (2000)
(explaining that over-investment in care is inefficient, but is not tortious).
52. Failure to adopt the alternative design would not, under that circumstance, render the
defendant's design "not reasonably safe."
53. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. From a broader perspective, the risk of
exposing sellers to liability based on what amount to attempt to rescue purchasers is widespread
in American products liability. See generally HENDERSON, JR., supra note 3.
141345:1399]
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
of third-party victims-typically employees.54 Of course, when the persons
making the decisions are, themselves, among the expected users of the
machinery, concerns over lack of motivation largely disappear." The same
sort of motivation to consider the welfare of third parties could be expected
when the purchaser is likely to be liable in tort to the parties at risk." But in
most instances commercial purchasers will be employers who enjoy
immunities from tort liability to their employees."
Thus, the question is presented: Are circumstances likely to arise in
which a product seller can determine at time of sale that a commercial
purchaser of industrial machinery is adequately motivated to weigh socially
relevant costs and benefits when deciding whether or not to adopt an
optional safety device? One important circumstance presents such a
possibility. Some commercial machines may be expected to be used in
several different work environments, in at least one of which the use of a
given safety device may not be feasible at acceptable costs. If one were to
refer to such a product as multifunctional and the safety device as
incompatible with one or more of the expected work environments, then a
product seller who offers optional safety devices for multifunctional
products would be reasonable in expecting the commercial purchasers of
such products to accept or reject the optional devices primarily on the basis
of whether the expected environments of use are compatible with those
safety devices. Because in such a circumstance the product seller could
reasonably trust the purchaser's motivations, delegation of responsibility to
the purchaser by means of a no-duty rule would be justified.
III. DECISIONAL PERSPECTIVES: How COURTS HAVE RESPONDED
TO OPTIONAL SAFETY DEVICES
The reported decisions dealing with the question of whether
manufacturers may delegate responsibility for deciding whether to install
optional safety devices do not articulate a coherent structure for resolving
the problem. Judged on the basis of the analysis in Part II, courts tend to
reach sound results, but provide scant guidance regarding the principles that
support their decisions. In denying RAD-based claims when sellers offer
optional safety devices, courts often observe that the purchaser was
54. See supra text accompanying note 40.
55. See supra notes 43, 46, 52, and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 11, 18, and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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sophisticated," that the danger against which a safety device was to protect
was obvious;59 that the safety device was inappropriate for a multifunctional
product; 60 and that industry custom allowed purchasers to make choices
regarding optional safety devices. 6' But these same courts fail to provide a
rationale for how to analyze the delegation issue. Part II developed an
analytical framework for deciding when delegation is justified, and why. It
is now time in this Part III to test the case law against that framework. The
reader should not expect a perfect fit. This area of the law is complex and
the elements identified earlier as necessary to justify delegation to the
market must be flexible if they are to work in deciding actual cases.
Nonetheless, if the decided cases were seriously out of line with the
analytical structure proposed in Part II, the authors would have cause for
concern.
A. Consumer Products: Rejecting Delegation
The case law with regard to consumer products generally supports the
position set forth earlier. For the most part, courts do not delegate to
unsophisticated, noncommercial consumers responsibility for deciding
whether to include optional safety devices. Thus, when a manufacturer sold
a radial saw without a blade guard, resulting in the amputation of the user's
fingers, the issue of whether the guard was a RAD was for the jury.62 The
availability of the guard as an option did not insulate the manufacturer from
58. See Scallan v. Duriron Co., 11 F.3d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding that a
chemical company that was world leader in chemical production was in the best position to
evaluate the various safety devices to meter chlorine leaks); Rainbow v. Alberta Elia Bldg. Co.
Inc., 436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 (App. Div. 1981) (finding that an experienced motorcyclist was in
best position to exercise an intelligent judgment in a making trade-off between cost and function
regarding whether crash bars were necessary on his motorcycle); Banzhaf v. ADT Security
Systems Southwest, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. App. 2000) (explaining that whether an alarm
system should have a duress code was a decision for the purchaser because of its superior
knowledge as to how best to secure its employees against criminals).
59. Price v. Niagra Machine & Tool Works, 136 Cal. Rptr. 535 (Ct. App. 1997)
(explaining that the need for safeguards for a press were obvious to user); Miller v. Dvornik,
501 N.E.2d 160 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (explaining that the risk of injury in a motorcycle crash is
obvious).
60. Tannebaum v. Yale Materials Handling Corp., 38 F.Supp.2d 425, 432-33 (D. Md.
1999) (finding that a rear door to a forklift would reduce its functional utility in a narrow
environment); Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(explaining that a roll bar is inconsistent with multifunctional use of a tractor).
61. Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing whether a
manufacturer of a cab and chassis had duty to install back-up safety devices depended in part on
trade custom of the injury).
62. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Kunze, 996 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App. Ct. 1999).
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liability. Similarly, when Volkswagen sold an automobile without a three-
point lap/shoulder belt for the rear seats, the fact that the manufacturer
offered such belts as options did not prevent the appellate court from
affirming a multi-million dollar verdict in favor of two plaintiffs.6' The
court held that the three-point belt was a RAD that should have been
installed by the manufacturer as standard equipment."
To be sure, in several well-known contexts courts leave important safety
decisions to the market. Most significantly, courts have steadfastly refused
to decide whether broad categories of products are reasonably safe.6 ' For
example, when products such as SUVs, 66 guns,67 or trampolines68 cause
harm the courts have delegated to consumers the question of whether these
categories of products are adequately safe. Although consumers do not have
perfect information regarding all the risks attendant to the use of such
products, they are well enough informed so as to make intelligent decisions.
Moreover, when consumers have access to experts who can guide their
decisions, courts leave decisions to the market. Thus, until recently, courts
did not review prescription drug designs; they instead delegated
responsibility to physicians-learned intermediaries who would make the
decision as to the risk/benefit trade-offs. 69 Although the Products Liability
63. Trull v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 320 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
64. Id. at 8-9.
65. See generally Harvey M. Grossman, Categorical Liability: Why the Gates Should be
Kept Closed, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 385 (1996); Henderson, Jr. & Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, supra note 7. But see
Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category Liability and Alternative
Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994). RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmts. d-e (1998) (rejecting category liability but leaving
open the possibility of category liability in the case of manifestly unreasonably designed
products).
66. Although on occasion courts may appear to talk in terms of category liability, see, for
example, Browserfield v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 11 F.Supp. 612, 619 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (assessing
the SUV's overall social utility), the vast majority of SUV cases are premised on the ability of
auto manufacturers to adopt alternative designs allowing for enhanced stability and for reduced
rollover tendencies. See, e.g., Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying
Ohio law); Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law);
Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
67. See, e.g., Shipman v. Jennings Firearms, Inc., 791 F.2d 1532, 1533-34 (11th Cir.
1986) (applying Florida law); Perkins v. F.I.E. Corp., 762 F.2d 1250, 1273 (5th Cir. 1985),
reh'g denied, 768 F.2d 1350 (1985) (applying Louisiana law).
68. Parish v. Jumpking Inc., 719 N.W.2d 540 (Iowa 2006).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. b (1998); James A.
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Diferent, Ill YALE L.J. 151 (2001).
More recent cases have indicated a willingness to review prescription drug designs. See, e.g.,
Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728, 732-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Tansy v.
Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 886 (Okla. 1994).
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Restatement recognizes a narrow exception allowing for judicial design
review of prescription"o drugs, delegation to learned intermediaries remains
the default rule.
Several cases involving optional safety devices for motorcycles appear at
first glance to also be exceptions to the rule of non-delegation to
consumers. In each instance the plaintiff injured his legs after a collision
with an automobile. Evidence showed that, had the motorcycles been
equipped with crash bars, the injuries would have been reduced or avoided.
The sellers had offered the crash bars as optional equipment, but the buyers
declined to purchase them. Post-injury, the purchasers claimed that the
manufacturers should have included the bars as standard equipment. In all
of these cases the courts denied liability, allowing delegation of
responsibility to the buyer. Although motorcycles are consumer products,
these decisions are consistent with the theoretical approach set forth in Part
II. Cyclists are, in general, sophisticated with regard to the equipment they
buy. Like the amateur ski racers mentioned earlier,72 motorcycle buffs
possess expertise beyond that of users and consumers of other products.
Because motorcyclists encounter risks that are generally self-regarding,"
presumably they have sufficient motivation to make reasonable cost-benefit
analyses. Moreover, there are downsides attached to safety crash bars-
some cyclists find them to be dangerous for their needs.74 Motorcycles, in
this sense, are somewhat multifunctional. Which safety feature is
appropriate for which type of bike may depend on the kind of cycling done
by the buyer. The willingness of courts to delegate responsibility, utilizing a
no-duty rule, is consistent with this Essay's analysis.
Perhaps the most telling aspect regarding optional safety devices for
consumer goods is the dearth of reported decisions in which the issue has
been litigated. The overwhelming majority of decisions raising the issue of
optional safety devices have involved the purchase and use of industrial
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998).
71. Williams v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 780 F.Supp. 251, 260-61 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding
that the danger of injury without a crash bar is obvious to cyclists); Miller v. Dvornik, 501
N.E.2d 160, 165 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (explaining that failure to recommend a crash bar does not
constitute a breach of duty of care); Rainbow v. Albert Building Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 482-83
(App. Div. 1981).
72. See discussion supra p. 18.
73. Unlike auto accidents in which there are often third party victims, motorcycle
accidents usually subject only the cyclist to injury. Crash bars are designed to protect the cyclist
from leg injuries.
74. See Rainbow, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 483. See also HARRY HURT, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP.,
MOTORCYCLE ACCIDENT CAUSE FACTORS AND IDENTIFICATION OF COUNTERMEASURES, VOL. 1:
TECHNICAL REPORT, 101-08, 418 (suggesting that reductions of injury to the ankle-foot by use
of crash bars is balanced by injury to the thigh-upper leg, knee and lower leg).
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equipment. Manufacturers of consumer goods generally understand that
they cannot delegate significant safety decisions to unsophisticated
consumers. Design litigation for consumer products focuses almost entirely
on whether there was a reasonable alternative design that would have been
safer. In today's legal environment, it appears that manufacturers rarely
consider delegation to ordinary consumers a viable option.
B. Industrial Machinery: Making Sense of the Case Law
By contrast to reported decisions involving consumer products, where
delegation to the market is rarely encountered, delegation to the market in
connection with industrial machinery cases is more prevalent. Two much-
cited early decisions set the stage for the debate that continues to this day.
The first case, Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing," involved a punch press that
did not prevent the employee from putting his hand at the point of operation
while inadvertently engaging the press with a foot pedal. As a result, the
ram of the press came down and crushed the plaintiff s hand. A simple two-
button device that would engage the ram only when plaintiffs hands were
away from the point of operation could have been installed in the punch
press and a jury could have found that it would have prevented the
plaintiffs injury. Plaintiff argued that it was industry custom for the
purchaser to choose which safety devices to install on punch presses." The
court concluded that the manufacturer could not escape liability based on its
belief that the punch press purchaser would take responsibility." Consistent
with the analysis in Part II, delegation was not warranted. Although the
employer-purchaser of the equipment clearly had knowledge of the dangers
associated with a press with a safety device and presumably had no
cognitive biases that would interfere with rational judgment, it lacked
adequate motivation to weigh the cost and benefits with regard to the
installation of the two-button safety device. Neither the corporate employer
nor its purchasing agent was at risk of personal harm. As explained in Part
II, the protection from tort liability that the employer enjoys under worker
compensation prevents the employer from facing the true costs of the injury
to its employees. Although the court in Bexiga refused to protect the
manufacturer with a no-duty rule, it recognized that the manufacturer's duty
to install a safety device was premised on whether it was feasible to do so."
Furthermore, if incorporation of the safety device "would render the
75. Bexiga v. Havir Mfg., 290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972).
76. Id. at 283.
77. Id. at 285.
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machine unusable for its intended purpose, then one might not infer defect
from the omission of the safety device."7 9 Thus, notwithstanding the court's
strong stand against delegation, it recognized in dictum that cases might
arise where delegation would be proper.
The second early industrial machinery decision, Biss v. Tenneco,so held
that if a purchaser declined to purchase an optional safety device the
manufacturer had no duty to include the device as standard equipment.
Plaintiffs decedent died violently when the loader he was operating
collided with a telephone pole. Plaintiff sued the loader manufacturer,
contending that it should have included as standard equipment a roll-over
protection structure ("ROPS") that would have protected him from injury in
the case of collision. The commercial seller offered a ROPS to the employer
who declined to buy it. The court observed that one of the dangers in the
use of construction equipment is injury from roll-over." However, since
"that danger increases or lessens according to the job and site for which the
equipment is purchased and used" it is the purchaser-employer who is "the
party in the best position to exercise and intelligent judgment to make the
trade-off between cost and function, and it is he who should bear the
responsibility if the decision on optional safety equipment presents an
unreasonable risk to users."8 2
Biss's willingness to delegate responsibility for adopting the ROPS to the
employer is questionable under the analysis in Part II. There appears to have
been no evidence that a ROPS would have been incompatible with other
uses of the loader. As noted earlier an indifferent employer, insulated from
tort liability, may rationally (though unreasonably) sacrifice the employees'
welfare and spare itself the cost of the optional safety device." Of course,
the manufacturer will not be liable automatically if it cannot invoke a no-
duty rule. A jury might well determine that the safety device was not a
reasonable alternative design. However, to avail itself of a no-duty rule the
fact that the employer has knowledge of the relevant danger and the
availability of a safety device is not sufficient. A reasonable seller must be
able to expect that the employer will be motivated to weigh the costs and
benefits in a responsible manner. Thus, the expected environment of a
product's use is a significant consideration in deciding whether to delegate
industrial safety devices to an employer. If a safety device is incompatible
with one or more expected work environments, a court has good reason to
79. Id.
80. Biss v. Tenneco, 409 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978).
81. Id. at 876.
82. Id.
83. See supra text accompanying nn. 42-43.
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believe that the employer is not simply selfishly disregarding employee
safety.8 4 That is why so many decisions regarding the appropriateness of
delegation base their conclusions on whether the product is unifunctional"
or multifunctional.s
Not all courts apply a no-duty rule when the plaintiff argues that the
optional safety device was incompatible with one or more environments in
which the product could be expected to be used. Instead, courts indulge in
risk-utility balancing and consider the multifunctional nature of the product
as a factor to be considered by the trier of fact. Many of these cases seem
wrongly decided; when manufacturers satisfy the conditions set forth for the
application of a no-duty rule, they deserve predictability that allows them to
84. See discussion supra p. 20.
85. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So.2d 854 (Ala. 1981) (holding a tractor
manufacturer liable for failing to install a ROPS as standard equipment on a tractor even though
the ROPS was offered as an option to the buyer since the normal use of the tractor in strip
mining created a serious risk of roll over on steep hillsides); Bilotta v. Kelley Co., Inc., 346
N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984) (finding that a dockboard manufacturer that did not incorporate
a panic stop as a standard feature could not delegate the decision to purchase the panic stop as a
safety device when the dockboards were unifunctional and would have prevented serious injury
to an employee); Passante v. Agway Consumer Products, Inc., 909 N.E.2d 563, 568 (N.Y. 2009)
(finding that a manufacturer and seller of a tractor trailer loading dock system that did not
include as a standard equipment a "Doc-lok" device, that secures the tractor trailer to the
loading dock, could not delegate to the purchaser the decision to purchase the safety device that
would have prevented injury to an employee since there was no showing that in normal use the
product was not unreasonably dangerous without the optional equipment).
86. See, e.g., Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 133, 135 (2d Cir. 1999)
(explaining that a manufacturer of a multi-use tractor loader that was not equipped with
overhead protection would be entitled to judgment if jury found that defendant met the Biss
factors); Austin v. Clark Equipment Co., 48 F.3d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that a
manufacturer of a forklift was not liable for failing to include audible alarms, rear view mirrors
and strobe lights since the need for these safety options depended upon the environment in
which the lift was used); Gordon v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th
Cir. 1978) (explaining that the punch press, "having been designed for many kinds of operation,
it was incumbent upon the machine purchaser to select safety devices appropriate for his
particular function."); Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324, (Colo. App. 1985)
(finding that a manufacturer and a used equipment dealer who offered a safety option to
purchaser of tractor who declined to purchase overhead protective device were not liable since
the manufacturer offered ninety different safety options designed to enhance safety within the
special context of the purchaser's needs); Westbrock v. Marshalltown Mfg., 473 N.W.2d 352,
357-58 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that a manufacturer of a multi-functional punch press
that could not protect point of operation dangers by a single safety feature was granted summary
judgment since delegation to the purchaser to choose the safety guards for the particular use was
a practical necessity); see also cases cited supra note 60.
87. See, e.g., Ogletree v. Navistar Co., 511 S.E.2d 204 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd on other
grounds, 522 S.E.2d 467 (Ga. 1999) (undertaking a risk/utility balancing rather than finding the
manufacturer was jusitifed in delegating the choice of safety devices to the purchaser since the
product was multifunctional, the court granted J.N.O.V.).
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offer optional safety devices without waiting for after-the-fact
adjudication(s) of whether they have acted reasonably.
C. The Scarangella Test for Delegation
Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc.8 8 represents something of a
landmark in that it attempts to identify with some precision the elements
that must be met in order for a manufacturer to reduce or eliminate its
design liability by offering an optional safety device. The plaintiff in that
case was injured when a school bus backed up and ran over her in a bus
parking lot. She sued the manufacturer of the bus for not having installed a
back-up alarm as standard equipment, arguing that such an alarm would
have alerted her to the fact that the bus was backing up. Her employer, the
Town of Huntington, had purchased ten school buses from the defendant
manufacturer and operated a fleet of 190 buses altogether. Huntington's
chief operating officer testified that he was aware that the manufacturer
offered back-up alarms but that he opted against them because whenever a
bus was put in reverse gear it would emit a screaming alarm signal. The bus
parking lot was in a residential neighborhood and neighbors had
complained about noise pollution." Purporting to take direction from earlier
New York case law, the court said that a manufacturer would not be liable
for selling a product without a safety device "when reasonable inferences
show that: (1) the buyer is thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the product
and its use and is actually aware that the safety feature is available; (2) there
exist normal circumstances of use in which the product is not unreasonably
dangerous without the optional equipment; and (3) the buyer is in a
position, given the range of uses of the product, to balance the benefits and
the risks of not having the safety device in the specifically contemplated
circumstances of the buyer's use of the product."90 The New York Court of
Appeals concluded that all the conditions had been satisfied and upheld the
trial judge's entry of directed verdict for the defendant.9
For the rule in Scarangella to function as a meaningful safe haven for
product sellers the factors set forth by the court will require considerable
revision. The first requirement-"that reasonable inferences show that the
buyer is thoroughly knowledgeable and is actually aware that the safety
88. 717 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1999).
89. Id. at 681.
90. Id. at 683.
91. Id. at 684.
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feature is available" 9 2-will not, in most cases, provide adequate protection.
Unless a seller is in direct contact with its purchaser, it cannot know
whether that purchaser is thoroughly knowledgeable or is actually aware
that a safety feature is available.93 For a no-duty rule to act as a safe haven,
the seller must be in a position to know at time of sale whether it has
complied with the demands of the law. As set forth in the Scarangella
opinion, the determination of the knowledge of the purchasers will depend
on underlying realities of which the seller may not be aware until after the
fact. Instead, an appropriate no-duty rule should focus on the reasonable
expectations of the product seller at time of sale. Can the seller reasonably
expect that, in general, the purchasers of its product are knowledgeable
about the product and aware of the availability of the safety feature? The
same point is relevant with regard to the third Scarangella94 requirement-
that the buyer be able to balance benefits and risks. The manufacturer
cannot know in advance, at the time of sale, whether a given purchaser is in
a position to balance the risks and benefits of the optional safety device.
Once again, a no-duty rule must rely on the reasonable expectations of the
seller at time of sale regarding whether buyers of its product, in general, are
in a position to properly weigh the risks and benefits of the safety device.
To be sure, when a seller is in direct contact with the buyer the seller may
have the sort of actual knowledge referred to in the first and third
Scarangella factors. However, given that such direct contact is often not
practicable, and that the underlying realities are often unavoidably
ambiguous, the rule must rely on the reasonable expectations of the seller.
The second factor set forth in Scarangella is also troubling. It purports to
provide a safe haven to a seller if there exist "normal circumstances of
use"9 5 in which the product is not unreasonably dangerous without the
optional equipment. Several problems attend this formulation. First, the
question for the product seller should not be whether normal circumstances
of use exist in which the safety option is not needed, but rather whether
92. Id. at 683. The reference by the court to "reasonable inferences" might be read to mean
that the court will decide whether the seller has reasonable expectations that buyers will, in
general, be knowledgeable of the risks and the availability of the safety options. However, the
requirement that the seller must show that the buyer "is thoroughly knowledgeable and is
actually aware that the safety feature is available" makes such a reading implausible. The court
seems to be saying that in each individual case there are reasonable factual inferences that can
be drawn as to the particular buyer's knowledge and actual awareness of the availability of the
optional safety feature. The test proffered by the authors looks to the reasonable expectations of
the seller that the class of buyers to whom the product is sold are knowledgeable of the risk and
are aware of the availability of the optional safety devices.
93. See supra text accompanying note 33.
94. See supra note 90.
95. Id.
1422 [Ariz. St. L.J.
OPTIONAL SAFETY DEVICES
purchasers will be motivated, in light of expected circumstances of use,
reasonably to weigh the costs and benefits of adopting an optional safety
device. The focus should not be on the normality of the expected use but on
whether the purchaser can be expected to be a socially responsible decision-
maker. Second, the requirement that the "product not be unreasonably
dangerous"96 without the optional safety device requires a court to engage in
risk/utility balancing regarding the safety of the product with and without
the optional safety device. However, the purpose of a no-duty rule is to
allow a court to decide the delegation issue without engaging in such risk-
utility analysis. The goal is to decide whether the purchaser is likely to
engage in rational, reasonable risk/utility balancing and not to decide, after
the fact, whether the purchaser actually made a reasonable risk/utility
choice. If the burden is placed on the seller to decide whether a good
risk/utility choice has been made, the seller has no safe haven. Simply
stated, a no-duty rule anticipates that on occasion a purchaser will, in fact,
make a bad risk/utility trade-off in deciding not to adopt an optional safety
device. As with other no-duty rules in the law of torts" a no-duty rule
governing optional safety devices cannot guarantee that the actor will, in
fact, act reasonably. If it did, the rule would simply be given over to a
negligence analysis in all cases.
In short, most of the reported decisions reach results consistent with the
analysis in Part II. That this area of the law has not yet been the subject of
rigorous analysis may have contributed to unnecessary confusion. In any
event, the time has come for this Essay to put its money where its mouth is.
It is time to consider how a Restatement might deal with optional safety
devices.
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Stockberger v. United States, 332 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that
rescuers have no duty); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (1998) (setting
forth elements for the imposition of a duty for post-sale failure to warn); DAN B. DOBBS, THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 232-36 (vol. 2 2001) (setting forth limited-duty rule for owners of land to
trespassers and invitees).
45:1399] 1423
ARIZONA STATE LA WJOURNAL
IV. A PROPOSED RESTATEMENT TREATMENT OF OPTIONAL
SAFETY DEVICES
00. OMISSION OF SAFETY DEVICE OFFERED AS DESIGN OPTION AT TIME
OF SALE
(a) A product is not defective in design based on the omission of a
safety device when the product seller offers the device as an
option at the time of sale and a reasonable seller would expect
those who purchase for use and consumption to make reasonable
decisions regarding whether or not to include the safety device
in the design.
(b) A reasonable seller would expect those who purchase for use
and consumption to make reasonable decisions under subsection
(a) if it can reasonably be expected that such purchasers are:
(1) knowledgeable regarding the product and its uses,
including both increased costs associated with inclusion
of the safety device and increased benefits in the form of
accident costs avoided by such inclusion;
(2) capable of reaching rational conclusions regarding
whether or not to include the safety device; and
(3) motivated, in light of expected circumstances of use, to
consider both the costs and the benefits associated with
inclusion of the safety device.
COMMENTS
a. This section applies only to claims for defective design.
Under §§ 1 and 2 of the Restatement, Third, products can be defective
because of manufacturing defects, design defects, or failures to instruct and
warn. This section relates only to design defects. Under § 2(b), a product
design is defective when plaintiff proves that a reasonable alternative design
(RAD) was available to the seller or a predecessor that would have reduced
the plaintiffs harm, and that failure to adopt the RAD rendered the product
not reasonably safe. This section provides that an omitted safety device will
not subsequently serve as a RAD for a plaintiff injured as a result of its
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omission when the defendant seller demonstrates that the conditions set
forth in subsections (a) and (b) are satisfied. The need for courts to be able
to rule for defendants as a matter of law (rather than give the issues to triers
of fact) is considered in Comment g, below.
b. Devices include a broader range of design features.
This section refers to "safety devices" because that is the phrase most
often used by courts and commentators. The somewhat broader phrase
"safety features" would also serve nicely, so long as the devices/features in
question are integrated into the product design. See Comment h.
c. The conditions set forth in subsection (a) are not exclusive.
As with Restatements generally, the connector "when" in subsection (a)
signals that the conditions set forth in that subsection are not exclusive.
Thus, while offering a safety device as an option at time of sale provides the
product seller with a reasonably reliable shelter from subsequent claims that
the optional safety device constitutes a RAD that should have been included
as standard equipment in the product design, other circumstances exist in
which the seller's omission of a safety device does not render a product
design defective. Foremost among these other circumstances are instances
in which, while the omission of the device renders a design less safe, it does
not render the design "not reasonably safe" under § 2(b) of the Restatement,
Third, of Torts: Products Liability (1998).
d The terms "sale" and "seller" include other modes of commercial
product distribution.
The Restatement, Third, of Torts: Products Liability (1998) is careful to
refer more expansively in § 1 and throughout to those "engaged in the
business of selling or otherwise distributing products." The references in the
instant section to product sales and sellers is intended to include the broader
range of commercial distributors embraced by the Restatement, Third. The
instant section uses more focused language merely for the sake of
convenience.
e. The "purchasers" that a seller might expect to make reasonable
decisions under subsections (a) and (b) are those who purchase for use
and consumption.
When a manufacturer distributes a product with a safety device as an
option, the purchasers referred to here are not the wholesalers and retailers
in the commercial claim to whom the manufacturer directly sells, but those
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who purchase from the wholesalers and retailers for the purpose of using or
consuming the product. In the normal course, the manufacturer who offers
an optional safety device can and does expect the wholesalers and retailers
to do likewise. But when the last seller in the commercial chain does not
offer its customers the option offered by the manufacturer, may the
manufacturer take advantage of the shelter provided by the instant section?
The answer depends on whether, under such circumstances, a reasonable
manufacturer/seller would expect end-purchasers to make reasonable
decisions. Such a reasonable seller would not harbor such an expectation
when the seller knows or should know that retailers are not giving the end-
purchasers an opportunity to decide. In that case, the injured plaintiff who
establishes a RAD-based design claim would recover against the
manufacturer, who would likely have rights of indemnity against the
wholesalers/retailers.
f The optional safety feature must be offered in good faith.
Because this section provides a no-duty rule that shelters product sellers
from liability that would otherwise follow from the omission of a safety
device, sellers might be tempted to offer safety devices as so-called
"options" under terms, such as unjustifiably high pricing, that are aimed at
discouraging purchasers from including them in their purchases. Courts
should be able to identify and ignore such bad faith offers when they
constitute little more than empty gestures.
g. When a reasonable seller would expect purchasers to make
reasonable decisions.
Grounding the availability of this section's shelter from liability on what
a reasonable seller would expect is centrally important to achieving this
section's objective of providing a no-duty rule by which sellers can, with a
reasonable measure of confidence, avoid design-based liability. Thus, for
sellers to be able to rely on the expectation that by offering optional safety
devices they are not providing rope by which tort plaintiffs will later hang
them under a RAD-based design-liability regime, they must be able to rely
on reasonable expectations based on appearances at time of sale. Of course,
as explained in Comment k, below, the applicable law must also supply
them with fairly firm assurances that specifically-described sets of
circumstances will lead to predictable outcomes when the question of what
a reasonable seller would expect arises later in the context of claims of
defective design.
1426 [Ariz. St. L.J.
OPTIONAL SAFETY DEVICES
h. When the safety device offered at time of sale is a separate product.
If the safety device offered as an option is a separate product-safety
goggles that may be worn while using a grinder sold by the defendant, for
example-then this section does not apply because an injured user's
subsequent claim that the seller of the grinder should have required that
such goggles be purchased would not be a claim that the grinder, itself, was
defectively designed. Were a grinder seller to offer the goggles as an option
at time of sale, or urge the purchaser to obtain and use such goggles, these
circumstances would presumably be relevant in connection with a plaintiff s
subsequent claim that the grinder was defective in design because it lacked
a built-in shield to prevent eye injuries; but because in that instance the
seller never offered the built-in guard as an option, this section would not
apply. In similar fashion, different categories of products do not serve as
optional devices for one another. Product categories are subject to a separate
no-duty rule of their own.
i. The optional safety device need not be identical to the RAD
proffered by the plaintiff making a claim of design defect.
If a product seller offers an optional safety feature that is different from,
but the functional equivalent of, the plaintiffs subsequently-proffered
RAD, this section applies if its conditions are satisfied. The safety device
earlier offered as an option need not be identical to the subsequent RAD for
the seller to be allowed to invoke the rule in this section as a shelter from
liability for defective design.
j. All of the conditions in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(3) must be
satisfied for the seller to take the advantage of the rule in subsection (a).
In keeping with traditional Restatement usage and in contrast to the
"when" terminology in subsection (a) (see Comment a, above), the
connector "if' in subsection (b) must be read as "if, but only if." Thus, the
conditions in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(3) are the exclusive criteria that
determine whether the shelter from design defect liability provided in
subsection (a) is available. A defendant seller's failure to prove any one (or
more) of the conditions will prevent defendant's reliance on this section.
k. Over time, courts must define more specifically the necessary
conditions set forth in subsections (b)(1) through (b)(3).
For the rule in this section meaningfully to provide product sellers a
shelter from liability upon which they may reasonably rely at time of sale,
courts must elaborate upon the conditions generally described in subsection
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(b). By way of examples, courts will likely conclude that purchasers who
are business entities with substantial experience gained from using certain
types of equipment satisfy, as a matter of law, the knowledgeability
condition set forth in subsection (b)(1); that as a matter of law individual
noncommercial purchasers placed at risk of serious physical injury lack the
capability, due to cognitive biases and faulty heuristics, of reaching rational
conclusions under subsection (b)(2); and that commercial employers who
purchase productive machinery for use by employee-users with respect to
whom the employers are immune from tort liability are not, as a matter of
law, adequately motivated under subsection (b)(3) to consider the increased
risks to those employees stemming from omission of an optional safety
device. The Comments to the relevant subsections explain why these
particular sub-rules make sense substantively. The point here is that, from a
formal standpoint, the sub-rules must be sufficiently specific to support
rulings as a matter of law in many frequently-recurring fact patterns. In this
respect, the courts' rule-making responsibility over time is similar to their
responsibility in developing specifically-defined categories of
ultrahazardous activities to which common law strict liability may apply.
1. The requirement in subsection (b)(1) that purchasers be expected to
be knowledgeable regarding the relevant costs and benefits relating to
the safety device.
Students of tort law will recognize this requirement as the first of two
characteristics that identify what efficiency theorists sometimes refer to as
the "most efficient cost minimizer," or "MECM." As subsection (b)(1)
indicates, the necessary knowledge relates to the costs and benefits
associated with inclusion of the safety feature. Courts generally assume that
an expert commercial purchaser possesses such knowledge as a matter of
law and that a nonexpert noncommercial purchaser does not-at least
regarding complex technology. It must be borne in mind that the defendant
must also prove the conditions in subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3)
m. The requirement in subsection (b)(2) that purchasers be expected to
be capable of responding rationally to the knowledge referenced in
subsection (b)(1).
This is the second characteristic classically expected of MECMs-the
capacity to act effectively on risk-utility information. If knowledgeability
under subsection (b)(1) relates to an actor's access to and grasp of empirical
data, the capability referenced in subsection (b)(2) relates to the actor's
cognitive capacity to use that information rationally. The major challenges
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to this capacity are a variety of cognitive biases. Thus, when an individual
purchaser is the person threatened with serious personal injury if the safety
device is omitted, the optimism bias-"It can't/won't happen to me"-may
interfere with the purchaser's capacity to reach a rational conclusion
regarding the need for the safeguard. Rather than decide these issues on a
case-by-case basis, courts will presumably develop sub-rules based on
presumptions, over time. The fact that the purchaser is the one threatened
with injury may assure sufficient motivation under subsection (b)(3) (see
Comment n, below); but that same circumstance may prevent the purchaser
from reaching a rational conclusion regarding whether the risk is great
enough to justify incurring the up-front cost of the safety device.
n. The requirement in subsection (b) (3) that the purchaser be expected
to be motivated to consider not only the costs of the safety device but
also the benefits in the form of reduced accident costs.
It will be observed that subsection (b)(3) adds a third criterion-
motivation-missing from the concept of most efficient cost minimizer, or
MECM, relied on by efficiency analysts of tort law. The reason why the
MECM concept need not concern itself with the actor's motives is that in
those contexts the problem is to identify which actor, among several
possibilities, should be held strictly liable for a particular set of accidental
harms. In that context, the proposed imposition of strict liability supports an
assumption of adequate motivation-the self-interest of a strictly liable
actor will presumably motivate the actor to reach reasonable decisions. In
the contexts covered by this optional safety device provision, the problem is
to determine whether the seller may reasonably expect that a purchaser is
not only sufficiently knowledgeable and capable of making reasonable,
efficient decisions but also whether, in the absence of the threat of tort
liability, he may be trusted to do so.
On the merits, when the purchaser is an individual who is placed at
increased risk of harm by omission of the safety device, it may be presumed
that the purchaser is motivated to consider the benefits of reducing the risks
of injury. And the same thing may be said regarding situations where the
purchaser's family or, more generally, the purchaser's loved ones, are the
beneficiaries of investments in design safety. By contrast, courts have
reason to be suspicious of motivations when the purchasers are employers
asked to decide whether to incur added costs to protect members of an
employee workforce for whom the employer is not concerned personally
and against whom the employer is immune, under worker compensation,
from liability in tort.
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o. When an optional safety device is incompatible with one or more
expected environments ofproduct use.
The phrase, "in light of expected circumstances of use," in subsection
(b)(3) refers to special situations in which a safety device, offered as an
option at time of sale and later proposed as a RAD by an injured plaintiff,
would be so costly to employ in connection with one or more expected
environments of use as to be incompatible with those environments. These
include what are referred to as "multifunctional product" situations in which
courts have ruled as a matter of law for defendant product sellers on the
ground that one or more expected environments of use render inclusion of
the safety device highly impracticable. Such examples of what courts and
commentators have deemed "incompatibility" serve to allay concerns that
the purchaser omitted an otherwise cost-effective safety device for the
selfish (and socially wasteful) reason that the purchaser would bear the
upfront costs of the added safety while others (e.g., employee-workers)
would enjoy the downstream benefits. When inclusion of a safety device
would significantly interfere with an expected mode of product use, a seller
the court may reasonably assume that, in significant measure, the purchaser
omitted the device for that efficiency-enhancing reason rather than for the
inefficiency-promoting reason of reducing the purchaser's costs irrespective
of significant negative effects on third-party victims.
p. High-end design options that, while they add to product safety, are
not cost-justified
In most cases to which the rule in this section applies, the safety device
offered as options are arguably cost-justified in the sense that finders of fact
would, but for the shelter from liability offered by this section, be warranted
in finding a product design defective were the device omitted from the
designs. In those contexts, this section gives knowledgeable, competent
purchasers the opportunity to "opt out" of arguably necessary safeguards.
Situations also arise where sellers offer especially risk-averse purchasers the
opportunity to "opt into" safety devices that, for most other purchasers, cost
more than they are worth. When a seller offers such high-end options,
subsequent claims that the optional devices should have been included as
standard equipment should fail, irrespective of the instant section, because
the plaintiffs will be unable to prove that the safety devices constitute
legitimate RADs.
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V. CONCLUSION
Clear answers to the question of when to delegate responsibility for
product design safety remain elusive. It is no easy matter for courts to
decide when to intervene and when to allow purchasers to decide how much
safety to incorporate into the products they buy. Optional safety devices
play an important role in that context. What has been lacking to date is a
structured approach to the issue. This Essay pulls together the various
strands of rationale offered by the courts into a coherent approach, and
offers a draft of a black-letter rule and comments in traditional restatement
format. Work remains to be done in applying the suggested approach to
future cases. The authors believe that this Essay provides an important
starting point for further development.
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